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INEQUITABLE SITING OF UNDESIRABLE 
FACILITIES AND THE MYTH OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When former California Governor George Deukmejian and the 
state legislature proposed to build a state prison in the City of Los 
Angeles, the tremendous public outcry from local residents caught 
them by surprise. l After years of absorbing undesirable facilities,2 
many people living near the proposed site felt that they should not 
play host to another.3 One group of residents, Mothers of East Los 
Angeles, launched an organized attack against the Governor's pro-
posal that has put the prison's future in doubt; in addition, they, 
along with other plaintiffs, brought suit against the state to stop, or 
at least delay, the prison's construction.4 These residents feel that 
the state government discriminates against their neighborhood be-
cause of its large percentage of poor working-class Mexican-Amer-
ican residents. 5 . 
I See Frank del Olmo, Prison Issue Inspires Eastside to do Battle, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1986, 
part 2, at 5. 
2 An undesirable facility is a facility "that everyone thinks we ought to have ... : airports, 
prisons, landfills, power plants and even low-income housing. All are generally thought 
essential to society-and yet widely opposed wherever they threaten to alight." MICHAEL 
O'HARE ET. AL., FACIUTY SITING AND PUBUC OPPOSITION I (1983). 
East Los Angeles residents, for example, have been subjected to several disruptive urban 
construction projects, including five freeways "gouging" through the eastside; several high 
rise buildings; and the construction of Dodger Stadium, requiring the bulldozing of old 
Mexican neighborhoods. See del Olmo, supra note 1, at 5. See also Keith v. Volpe, 618 F. 
Supp. 1132 (D.C. Cal. 1985), afl'd, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) (residents in the path of a 
proposed freeway (Caltrans) filed an environmental and civil rights lawsuit against state and 
federal government officials). 
• See George Ramos & Gabe Fuentes, One Suit Filed, Another OKd to Oppose Prisons, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1990, at 3B. 
4 See id.; Telephone Interview with Keith Pritsker, Attorney for the City of Los Angeles 
(Feb. 7,1992); Telephone Interview with Frank Villalobos, Community Activist, Los Angeles, 
Cal. (Feb. 10, 1992). 
5 While community leaders such as Juana Gutierrez assert that undesirable facilities are 
being located disproportionately in poor latino communities in Los Angeles, the suit alleges 
that the state failed to submit an adequate environmental impact report (EIR) that accounts 
for all potential hazards of the prison. See Ramos & Fuentes, supra note 3, at 3; Louis 
Sahagun, The Mothers of East L.A. Transform Themselves and Their Neighborhood, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 1989, part 2, at 1. According to an attorney with the city of Los Angeles, the suit 
challenges the EIR and does not address the discrimination issue because proving discrimi-
natory purpose in a court of law would be too difficult. Telephone Interview with Keith 
Pritsker, Attorney for the City of Los Angeles (Feb. 7, 1992). 
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In New York City, a group calling itself the Coalition of Bed-
ford-Stuyvesant Block Association (Coalition) also attempted, but 
failed, to stop the conversion of an armory in the Bedford-Stuyves-
ant section of Brooklyn into a shelter for homeless men.6 The 
Coalition and other community groups continue to oppose the 
dumping of such "social ills," including an AIDS hospice, a meth-
adone clinic, and a jail, in their predominantly black community.7 
Communities composed primarily of underrepresented 
persons8 frequently have been chosen to host undesirable facilities. 
Although there are many issues of concern planners and 
developers9 face in choosing a particular location to site a facility, 10 
6 Leonard Buder, Judge Sees No Bias in Sites of Shelters for Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
1987, at B5. See also Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202, 
1205,1210 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
7 Merle English, Bed-Stuy Residents Set City Hall March, NEWSDAY, Brooklyn Edition, May 
10, 1989, at 23; Merle English, Blacks Fight Community Threats; Neighbors Mobilized for Action, 
NEWSDAY, City Edition, May 7,1989, at 4. 
8 "Underrepresented persons" and "minority" as used herein refer to racial categories, 
defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, classified as blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Pacific 
Islanders, and American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts and other "non-white" persons. COMMIS-
SION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-EcONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 9 (1987) [hereinafter UCC REPORT]. Because 
the term "community" carries various meanings in different contexts, for the purpose of this 
Note, community is broadly defined as five-digit zip code areas, id., or as census areas. See 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTES LANDFILLS AND THEIR COR-
RELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 2-3 (1983) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]' For a more detailed discussion on race and socioeconomic char-
acteristics of communities with commercial hazardous waste sites, see generally ROBERT D. 
BUl.LARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990); 1 ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COM-
MUNITIES (1992) [hereinafter EPA EQUITY REPORT]; GAO REPORT, supra; UCC REPORT, supra; 
Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environ-
mentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 69 (1991); Luke W. Cole, 
Correspondence, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
1991 (1992); Kelley M. Colquette & Elizabeth A. H. Robertson, Environmental Racism: The 
Causes, Consequences, and Commendation, 5 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 153 (1991); Rachel D. Godsil, 
Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394 (1991); Naikang Tsao, Amelio-
rating Environmental Racism: A Citizen's Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic 
Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366 (1992); and Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal 
Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2 [hereinafter 
National Law Journal Study]. 
9 "Planners and developers" refer to persons generally responsible for siting decisions. 
This may include locally elected officials. 
IO See O'HARE, supra note 2, at 1-2, 4. Although socioeconomic status plays a role in 
undesirable facility siting, the UCC Report concluded that "race proved to be the most 
significant among variables tested in association with the location of commercial hazardous 
waste facilities [across the United States]." UCC REPORT, supra note 8, at xiii. 
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the site selection process often follows a "path of least resistance." 1 1 
More often than not, this path leads to minority communities where 
political resistance may be ineffectual, resources to fight a pro-
tracted legal battle may be lacking, and public awareness may be 
limited. 12 These communities must then absorb the negative costs 
associated with undesirable facilities. 13 
Based on the conclusions of several recent studies, under-
represented persons living in communities disproportionately bur-
dened with undesirable facilities may be victims of race discrimi-
nation. 14 Because federal, state, and municipal officials participate 
in siting procedures, persons living in these communities who may 
be victims of discrimination are potentially entitled to relief under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 15 This Note argues, however, that the 
burden of establishing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause is 
so onerous that equal protection is incapable of affording relief to 
those who may be victims of discrimination in the context of facility 
siting. Without the possibility of relief based on equal protection, 
II BULLARD, supra note 8, at xiv, 4. See ·Dick Russell, Environmental Racism: Minority 
Communities and Their Battle Against Toxics, 11 AMICUS J. 22, 23 (1989). 
12 BULLARD, supra note 8, at 4. See Russell, supra note II, at 25-26. Minority communities 
have been especially attractive to siting committees because the communities often lack the 
political and economic power needed for opposition-they are "paths of least resistance" in 
that these communities are easier targets for siting than white affluent communities. See 
Russell, supra note 11, at 24. 
IS In Facility Siting and Public Opposition, the authors Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow, 
and Debra Sanderson suggest that communities be reimbursed for assuming negative factors 
associated with an undesirable facility. See supra note 2, at 68-73. They propose that in 
exchange for siting an undesirable facility in a particular community, the developer should 
compensate the community for assuming the negative externalities. In this manner, the host 
community is "paid" for assuming the externalized costs and risks of the undesirable facility. 
[d. 
The compensation approach is unfair, however, because many minority communities 
need the items used as inducements even before assuming the risks of an undesirable facility. 
See BULLARD, supra note 8, at 102. Moreover, the communities may exchange their health 
and neighborhood ambience for a package that may not materialize or adequately compensate 
for losses. See id. In an interview with community leader Charles Streudit, Bullard quoted 
Streudit as saying: "Sure, Browning-Ferris Industries [owner of Whispering Pines Landfill 
in Houston, Texas], pays taxes, but so [does our black community] .... But we shouldn't 
have to be poisoned to get improvements for our children." [d. at 94. New York City, for 
instance, located the city's largest sewage-treatment plant in West Harlem in exchange for 
the construction of a state park on the roof of the facility. Austin & Schill, supra note 8, at 
70. While the plant is in operation, the park has yet to be completed. [d.· 
14 See VCC REPORT, supra note 8, at xiii; GAO REpORT, supra note 8, at 1. 
15 See generally Godsil, supra note 8, for a discussion on the use of the Equal Protection 
Clause and Civil Rights Act in cases alleging discrimination in the siting of commercial 
hazardous waste facilities. 
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efforts by minority communities to fight against unfair siting prac-
tices are reduced to "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) tactics. I6 Com-
munities claiming discrimination in the siting process are addressing 
a problem rooted deep in this country's social and political struc-
tures-they are not just using NIMBY to oppose a specific facility 
at a specific siteY 
Central to the siting controversy is the siting process itself, 
which is lengthy, involves many parties, and requires the combined 
skills of various professionals. IS Siting practices, which are con-
ducted usually in accordance with state siting statutes,19 are highly 
susceptible to political forces. 2o An active and aware coalition of 
local residents and community leaders opposing the siting of .an 
undesirable facility can derail a project or at least discourage con-
sideration of a community as a potential site.21 Although an in-
16 Many in the urban planning professions use the term NIMBY to refer to public 
opposition to undesirable facilities. See Robert C. Mitchell and Richard T. Carson, Siting of 
Hazardous Facilities: Property Rights, Protest, and the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities, 76 AEA 
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 285, 286 (1986). 
17 The disproportionate impact of undesirable facilities on poor and non-white com-
munities also may be a global phenomenon. For example, the United Nations recently alleged 
that a Swiss and an Italian firm entered into an agreement with Somalia to dump up to 
550,000 tons of waste in that country. Associated Press, Two firms plan to dump toxic waste in 
Somalia, UN says, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 1992, at 5. Other articles and authorities have 
noted environmental and social problems associated with developed nations using developing 
countries as waste dumps. See generally Julienne I. Adler, Symposium Issue on the Selection and 
Function of the Modern Jury: Comment: United States' Waste Control Program: Burying Our Neighbors 
in Garbage, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 885 (1991); Theresa A. Wallbaum, America's Lethal Export: The 
Growing Trade in Hazardous Waste, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 889 (1991); Charles Lee, Address at 
the Boston College Diversity Month Racism and the E~vironment Speaker Series (Mar. 3, 
1992) (transcript on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal) [hereinafter Lee 
Address]. 
18 See O'HARE, supra note 2, at 6-9. 
19 See, e.g., Bram D.E. Canter, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the New State Siting Programs, 
14 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 421 (1982); Celeste B. Duffy, State Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: 
Easing the Process Through Local Cooperation and Preemption, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 755, 
773-96 (1984). 
20 See O'HARE, supra note 2, at 6-9. Belknap Data Solutions conducted a study to inves-
tigate the factors governing the decisions of 1000 of the largest U.S. industrial corporations 
on locating new facilities. BELKNAP DATA SOLUTIONS LTD., FACILITY LOCATION DECISIONS 
Introduction (1977). The study reported that "[h]alf the companies [surveyed] have concealed 
their identities when looking for new locations .... " Id. at 1. Although control of the site 
price was the primary reason for concealing identity, the next major reason was "to avoid 
nuisance of phone calls, salesmen, pressure from site location committees, etc." Id. at 23. See 
also ROGER W. SCHMENNER, MAKING BUSINESS LOCATION DECISIONS 19 (1982) (discussing how 
a business searching for a new location makes "discreet" or "anonymous" contact with 
potential host communities). 
2' Some communities have been successful in defeating proposals for the siting of un-
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depth description of various siting mechanisms is beyond the scope 
of this Note, an assumption underlying the Note's discussions is 
that siting processes in general are highly complex and subject to 
an infinite number of influences. 22 
This Note uses the on-going debate over the disproportionate 
impact of facilities such as incinerators and hazardous waste dumps 
on minority communities as a model for other similarly undesirable 
facilities. Although most, if not all, published reports on the dis-
proportionate impact of undesirable facilities on minority commu-
nities focus on hazardous waste sites, the same discrepancies may 
exist in other contexts such as the siting of prisons, airports, high-
ways, housing projects, sewage treatment plants, and homeless 
shelters. 
Part II presents the findings of various studies that document 
the disproportionate siting of undesirable facilities in communities 
composed primarily of underrepresented persons. Part III sketches 
the development of the equal protection doctrine. Part IV discusses 
cases where plaintiffs have used, unsuccessfully, the equal protec-
tion doctrine to challenge discrimination in facility siting. These 
claims faltered in court because the plaintiffs could not adequately 
prove discriminatory purpose. Part IV also discusses an alternate 
equal protection analysis in which a court would apply heightened 
scrutiny where the historical and social contexts of siting statutes, 
siting decisions, and environmental impacts demonstrate racial bias. 
Finally, the Note concludes that the present equal protection doc-
trine is ineffective for addressing discrimination in the context of 
siting undesirable facilities because it requires an unrealistically high 
burden of proof. Without some form of judicial intervention, per-
sons suffering from what may be discriminatory siting practices 
remain vulnerable and must fend for themselves against possibly 
insurmountable odds. 
desirable facilities in their neighborhoods by way of the NIMBY phenomenon. See Donna L. 
Kolar, Practical Advice for Permitting a Waste Disposal Facility, 4 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 11, 
11 (1989). Robert D. Bullard, a professor at the University of California at Riverside and the 
author of Dumping In Dixie: Race, Class and Environmental Quality, claims that "whites have 
contributed to the environmental problems in minority areas" by being more successful in 
keeping undesirable facilities out of their communities through NIMB Y. BULLARD, supra note 
8, at 89. NIMBY tactics pressure site search committees to look for more accommodating 
communities; these are usually minority neighborhoods which have not been as effective as 
white neighborhoods with NIMBY. Id. at 45. 
22 See generally Canter, supra note 19; Duffy, supra note 19. 
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II. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
Undesirable facilities have external costs: they negatively im-
pact the health, safety, and general welfare of residents, and devalue 
neighboring property.23 Such facilities may affect adversely the am-
biance of any neighborhood. Because the whole of society benefits 
from these facilities, all should bear equally the social costs associ-
ated with their construction and operation. According to the find-
ings of numerous studies and authorities, however, equal distribu-
tion of costs does not occur.24 
In a 1983 United States General Accounting Office study (GAO 
Report), the GAO found a relationship between the siting of off-
site hazardous waste landfills and the racial makeup of surrounding 
and host communities in several southern states together known as 
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Region IV.25 The 
objective of the GAO Report was to determine the correlation be-
tween the location of hazardous waste landfills and the racial and 
economic status of surrounding communities in Region IV.26 The 
GAO Report found that blacks made up the majority of the pop-
ulation in three of the four communities where the four off-site 
hazardous waste landfills in Region IV are located.27 The findings 
of the GAO Report, along with other developments in issues sur-
rounding the siting of hazardous waste facilities in racial commu-
nities,28 led to a 1986 study conducted by the United Church of 
Christ Commission for Racial Justice (UCC Report). 
The UCC Report is perhaps the most comprehensive and con-
clusive study regarding the disproportionate impact of hazardous 
waste facility siting practices on minority communities. The UCC 
2' See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 
1979), afi'd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET. AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A CASEBOOK ON NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 42 (1992). 
24 UCC REPORT, supra note 8, at xiii; GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also National 
Law Journal Study, supra note 8, at S2; Lee Address, supra note 17. 
25 GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-2. Off-site hazardous waste landfills are those which 
dispose of hazardous waste generated at facilities remote to the landfill. On-site waste dis-
posals are located where the hazardous wastes are generated, such as at industrial and 
manufacturing plants. The EPA Region IV is composed of the following eight states: Ala-
bama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennes-
see. [d. 
26 [d. at 2. 
27 [d. at 1. 
28 A 1982 demonstration in opposition to the siting of a hazardous waste facility in 
Warren County, North Carolina, helped direct the focus of the UCC Report towards studying 
the relationship between hazardous waste facilities and race. UCC REPORT, supra note 8, at 
xi-xii. 
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Report found that race was the most significant variable associated 
with the siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities. 29 This find-
ing was consistent across the United States.30 
In 1990, the EPA conducted a study on environmental equity 
(EPA Equity Report).31 The EPA Equity Report found that racial 
minorities experience differences in exposure to pollutants and are 
subject to discrepancies in the siting of undesirable facilities. 32 Al-
though the study concluded that there were limited data explaining 
the environmental contribution to differences in disease and death 
rates among racial groups, the study found that underrepresented 
persons and low-income populations experienced greater exposures 
to pollutants and waste facilities.33 
29 Id. at xiii. 
so Id. The UCC Report examined two cross-sectional studies on demographic patterns 
associated with commercial hazardous waste facilities and uncontrolled waste sites. Id. at 9. 
The first study revealed that "the minority percentage of the population in relation to the 
presence of commercial hazardous waste facilities was statistically very significant." Id. at 13. 
Additionally, the UCC found that communities with the highest number of commercial 
hazardous waste facilities also had the greatest composition of minority residents. Id. at xiii. 
Furthermore, in communities with two or more facilities or one of the nation's five largest 
landfills, the average percentage of underrepresented persons of the population was 38%, 
whereas in communities without facilities the figure was 12%. /d. (the report noted that "race" 
was measured by "minority percentage of the population"). Race also played a more signif-
icant role in the siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities than socioeconomic status. 
Id. The second study found a widespread presence of uncontrolled toxic waste sites in 
communities composed primarily of underrepresented persons.ld. at xiv. Uncontrolled waste 
sites are those that are closed and abandoned. Id. at xii. 
Since the Commission published the VCC Report, racism in the environment has sur-
faced as an important and high profile issue in this nation's environmental and civil rights 
debate. Lee Address, supra note 17. For example, the United Church of Christ sponsored 
the first National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in October 1991 in 
Washington, D.C. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, PROGRAM 
GUIDE: THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT title 
page (1991). 
31 EPA EQUITY REPORT, supra note 8, at 2; All Things Considered (National Public Radio 
broadcast, Feb. 8, 1992) [hereinafter All Things Considered]. 
S2 See EPA EQUITY REpORT, supra note 8, at 12-15. 
3S /d. at II, 12-15. Robert Wilcott of the EPA claims, however, that economic factors and 
not racism are responsible for inequities in undesirable facility siting. All Things Considered, 
supra note 31. Wilcott claims that firms making siting decisions do not operate "strictly from 
a racial targeting basis," but base them on efficiency considerations such as land cost. Id. 
The EPA's findings were subject to a critical attack by California Congressman Henry 
A. Waxman, chairman of the House Health and the Environment Subcommittee, when 
preliminary results were first publicized. In a news release issued by Congressman Waxman, 
he criticized the EPA Equity Report for "driv[ing] a wedge between activist groups and 
traditional civil rights organizations [by] show[ing] no appreciation of the serious environ-
mental threats faced by minority communities." Congressman Henry A. Waxman News 
Release, Environmental Equity Report is Public-Relations Ploy, Feb. 24, 1992 (transcript on file 
with the Boston College Third World Law Journal) [hereinafter Public-Relati()ns Ploy]. 
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These studies reveal the disproportionate siting and impact of 
undesirable facilities in communities composed primarily of under-
represented persons. The findings reflect a national pattern and 
indicate that the way local governments site undesirable facilities is 
socially unjust: race is somehow related to how costs associated with 
undesirable facilities are distributed.34 At the very least, these com-
munities are entitled the same treatment as their white cohorts 
pursuant to the equal protection doctrine. 
III. THE MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that 
"[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
Congressman Waxman also accused the EPA of "being concerned about appearances, not 
substance." !d. 
In a related but separate staff report, Waxman summarized EPA internal agency docu-
ments showing that the confidential EPA "communications plan" for the EPA Equity Report 
promotes an objective that conflicts with the stated purpose of the EPA Equity Report. Henry 
A. Waxman, Staff Report, The Real Story Behind EPA's Environmental Equity Report: An Eval-
uation oj Intanal EPA Memoranda, Feb. 24, 1992 (no page numbers) (transcript on file with 
the Boston College Third World Law Journal). Congressman Waxman claims that the Equity 
Report is "less than candid about EPA's track record" and that the EPA has resisted "initiatives 
to address proven instances of disproportionate impact." Id. Waxman alleges that the EPA 
fears environmental equity would become "one of the most politically explosive environmen-
tal issues yet to emerge." Public Relations Ploy, supra. The EPA's confidential "communication 
plan." according to Waxman, was designed to prevent the issue from reaching a "flash point" 
by winning over mainstream environmental groups while simultaneously slighting grassroots 
groups. /d. 
'H Even in the enforcement of federal environmental laws, underrepresented persons 
are more prone to unequal treatment than their white counterparts. Moreover, this unequal 
treatment is influenced more by race than by income, according to a recent study of every 
United States environmental lawsuit concluded in the past seven years. National Law journal 
Study, supra note 8, at S2. 
The National Law journal Study produced several findings based on a computer-assisted 
analysis of census data, the civil court docket of the Environmental Protection Agency, and 
the agency's own performance record at 1,177 toxic waste sites slated for cleanup pursuant 
to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (also known 
as CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). The study found that penalties 
under hazardous waste laws at sites with the greatest white populations were about 500% 
higher than penalties at sites having the greatest population of underrepresented persons. 
National Law journal Study, supra note 8, at S2. 
Under Superfund, abandoned hazardous waste sites in areas occupied by underrepre-
sented persons take 20% longer to be placed on the national priority action list than those 
in white areas. Id. Furthermore, action on cleanup at Superfund sites occupied by under-
represented persons begins from 12'lc to 42'lc later than at sites occupied by whites. !d. 
Finally, at sites occupied by minorities, the EPA chooses "containment"-the capping or 
walling off of a hazardous dump site-seven percent more often than the cleanup method 
preferred under the law-permanent treatment. Id. On the other hand, the EPA orders 
permanent treatment rather than containment 22% more often at white sites. Id. 
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equal protection of the laws."35 Congress enacted the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868 to address racial discrimination against 
blacks.36 The modern Supreme Court often has stated that a law 
alleged to be racially discriminatory must have a racially discrimi-
natory purpose.37 Accordingly, a racially disproportionate impact 
created by governmental action is not unconstitutional per se--dis-
criminatory purpose must still be shown.38 
"U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § l. 
36 See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586 (1Ith ed. 1985); Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U.S. 217, 220 (1970). 
37 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976); Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1976). 
38 [d. There are two types of discrimination associated with governmental action: de jure 
and de facto. GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 687-88. De jure discrimination occurs when a law, 
though neutral in language and application, is enacted with a purpose or motive to discrim-
inate. [d. at 687. De facto discrimination refers to "governmental action that is racially neutral 
in its language, administration, and purpose but which has a disadvantaging impact or effect." 
[d. As Gerald Gunther, professor of law at Stanford University, has noted, in modern cases 
that allege non-obvious purposeful discrimination (such as in the siting of undesirable facil-
ities) of either form (de jure or de facto), the central issues concern what data are important 
and what burdens of proof apply to the challenger and the government. [d. 
Under equal protection analysis, there are varying degrees of judicial scrutiny. Under 
rationality analysis, a challenged law or state action neutral on its face must be "reasonable, 
not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be 
treated alike" in order to be constitutional. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 
415 (1920); see also GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 594. Where a challenged law or state action 
treats groups differently on the basis of race, the standard of judicial review is strict scrutiny. 
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Under strict scrutiny analysis, "to 
pass constitutional muster, [the law or state action) must be justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest [and be necessary to accomplish a) legitimate purpose." Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). Between these two standards lies intermediate (heightened) 
scrutiny, whereby a governmental action must serve "important" objectives and "must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976). The standard is 
"intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends must be "compel-
ling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under [rationality analysis), 
"important" objectives are required here; and where means must be "necessary" 
under [strict scrutiny) and merely "rationally related" under [rationality analysis), 
they must be "substantially related" to survive the "intermediate" level of review. 
GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 59l. 
A facially neutral law, however, may effect purposeful discrimination through its admin-
istration. [d. at 688 (discussing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). Although in Yick 
Wo statistical data were sufficient to demonstrate purposeful discrimination, instances of such 
conclusive data are rare. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 
U.S. 252. 266 (1976). Since Yick Wo, the use of statistical and other empirical data allegedly 
showing purposeful discrimination has been commonplace, though "controversial," because 
the Court is not clear as to how much data is adequate to show purposeful discrimination. 
GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 689. 
In modern cases, the Court has often discussed "improper motive" (discriminatory intent) 
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Prior to 1976, many lower courts believed that de facto discrim-
ination, like de jure discrimination, was unconstitutional. 39 This be-
lief was due largely to the manner in which the Supreme Court 
handled discrimination claims based on congressional statute. For 
example, in Griggs v. Duke Power CO.,40 former Chief Justice Burger 
stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrim-
inatory in operation."41 The Court found that "Congress directed 
the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, 
not simply the motivation."42 A year later, however, the Court re-
jected a de facto discrimination claim in Jefferson v. Hackney. 43 The 
Court refused to accept the appellants' theory that disproportionate 
impact alone was sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination 
because such an acceptance "would render suspect each difference 
in treatment among ... classes, however lacking in racial motivation 
and however otherwise rational the treatment might be."44 The 
Court indicated that substituting "effect" for "purpose" would ren-
der unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment most leg-
islative efforts to address social problems through welfare 
programs.45 
The Supreme Court clarified its stand on the requisite proof 
requirements for discrimination claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the 1976 case, Washington v. Davis.46 The Court 
indicated that disproportionate impact alone was insufficient to 
prove discrimination, though it may be evidence of discriminatory 
instead of "improper purpose" (discriminatory purpose) in equal protection claims. Id. Im-
proper motive differs from improper purpose in that legal inquiries into motive focus on 
the defendant's subjective state of mind, while purpose analysis relies on objective empirical 
data about the administration of the law. The terms, however, are used often by the courts 
in an indistinguishable manner. Id. at 689-90. 
'9 GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 69l. 
40 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
411d. at 43l. In Griggs, the plaintiff challenged the legality of intelligence tests and high 
school diploma requirements for job applicants. Id. at 425-26. Griggs alleged that the em-
ployment discrimination provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited these job 
requirements. See id. 
4'ld. at 432 (emphasis in original). 
43 406 U.S. 535 (1972). Appellants challenged the constitutionality of applying a lower 
percentage reduction factor (to determine standard of need) to Texas recipients of Aid to 
Families With Dependent Children than that applied to those recipients of assistance pursuant 
to other programs (there was a higher proportion of minorities among the AFDC recipients 
than in the other groups). [d. at 537-38. 
44 /d. at 548. 
45 See id. at 548-49; GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 692. 
46 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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purpose.47 Thus, proving discrimination in the siting process of an 
undesirable facility requires proof of discriminatory purpose. 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corporation48 
reaffirmed Washington v. Davis and also attempted to define what 
would meet the purposeful discrimination standard. In Arlington 
Heights, the plaintiff sued a Chicago suburb for refusing to rezone 
certain property from single-family to multi-family use.49 A non-
profit developer wanted to build federally subsidized housing units 
in a predominantly white suburb. 50 The housing would have at-
tracted low and moderate income tenants, including minorities. At 
the trial level, the court found that concerns for preserving the 
zoning plan's "integrity" were responsible for the refusal, and not 
social hostility.51 The court of appeals reversed the decision and 
held that the refusal was unconstitutional because its "ultimate ef-
fect" was racially discriminatory. 52 Justice Powell, however, rejected 
the court of appeals' reliance on effect rather than purpose because 
effect alone did not prove a sufficiently discriminatory purpose. 53 
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that disproportionate impact was 
a good starting point for an inquiry into discriminatory purpose. 54 
Powell outlined various inquiries for determining and proving 
discriminatory purpose. These include queries into the impact of 
the official action, historical background, sequence of events, de-
partures from normal decision-making processes, and legislative 
history. 55 The historical background of the state's decision or action 
may reveal "a series of official actions taken for invidious pur-
poses."56 The specific series of events preceding the disputed deci-
sion or action also may reveal invidious discrimination in the state's 
actions. 57 Evidence of departure from standard decision-making 
procedures also may indicate improper purpose, as will substantive 
departures, especially if factors ordinarily held important by chal-
lenged decision-makers "strongly favor a decision contrary to the 
47 See id. at 242. 
48 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
49Id. at 254. 
50 Id. at 254-55. 
51 Id. at 259. 
52Id. at 259-60 
55Id. at 264-65. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976). 
54 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.; 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1976). 
55 Id. at 267-68. 
56 Id. at 267. 
57Id. 
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one reached."58 The Court indicated that the legislative or admin-
istrative history might be important, such as minutes of the decision-
making body.59 These written histories can shed light on discrimi-
natory purpose hidden in the legislators' actions or decisions. The 
Court concluded its suggestions for other evidentiary inquires by 
noting that the list was not exhaustive.60 
The answers to these queries may provide sufficient evidence 
that discriminatory purpose "was a motivating. factor," that is, that 
there is an inference of discriminatory purpose in the defendant's 
decision.61 If so, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that 
the same decision would have resulted even without discriminatory 
purpose.62 If the defendant were successful in meeting this burden, 
then no purposeful discrimination would be found. 
Showing discriminatory purpose in an equal protection claim 
is a difficult burden to carry, as exemplified by McCleskey v. Kemp.63 
In McCleskey, the defendant was sentenced to death for murdering 
a white police officer during the course of an armed robbery.64 In 
McCleskey's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he included a 
claim-based on the Baldus Study65-that the Georgia capital sen-
58Id. 
59Id. at 268. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 270 
62Id. at 270-71 n.21. 
63 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987). See also Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1151 (1991). Eisenberg and Johnson criticize the. modern Court's heavy burden for 
proving requisite intent (purpose) in discrimination cases. Eisenberg & Johnson, supra, at 
1159. Eisenberg and Johnson note that, in addition to McCleskey, other cases, such as City of 
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981) (allowing the City of 
Memphis to close a road that kept blacks from traveling through a white neighborhood), 
that are decided under the Davis standard have "disturbing" and "troublesome" outcomes. 
Eisenberg & Johnson, supra, at 1159. Indeed, Eisenberg and Johnson are two among many 
who have commented on the difficulty of meeting the discriminatory purpose standard. See 
generally David Robert Baron, The Racially Disparate Impact of Restrictions on the Public Funding 
of Abortion: An Analysis of Current Equal Protection Doctrine, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1993); 
Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adju-
dication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination 
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
1049 (1978); Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 
1163 (1978); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 
U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977); M.F. Rice, The Discriminatory Purpose Standard: A Problem for 
Minorities in Racial Discrimination Litigation?, 6 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1986). 
64 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 283. 
65 The results of this study are published in DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY (1990). 
1993] INEQUITABLE SITING PRACTICES 245 
tencing process was administered in a racially discriminatory man-
ner in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 
Justice Powell's majority opinion, however, refused to accept 
the Baldus Study results as proof of discriminatory purpose because 
the proof was not "exceptionally clear."67 The plaintiff failed to 
prove both that the death penalty was imposed "because of" and 
not "in spite of" the ethnicity of the condemned, and that the 
Georgia legislature maintained capital punishment because of the 
racially disproportionate impact.68 The Court did not infer discrim-
inatory purpose even in the face of the compelling findings of the 
Baldus Study. 
As case law suggests in Davis, Arlington Heights, and McCleskey, 
the equal protection doctrine has evolved to require a high standard 
of proof in discrimination cases. Showing discriminatory effect is 
usually no longer sufficient to prove discriminatory purpose in most 
every instance. Because discriminatory purpose is difficult to prove, 
plaintiffs in several cases have discovered that modern equal pro-
tection is not a viable source of relief for those who may be suffering 
from discriminatory siting practices. 
IV. MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
SITING PROCESSES 
A. Case Law 
In Bean v. Southwestern Management Corporation,69 the plaintiffs 
requested a preliminary injunction contesting a decision by the 
Texas Department of Health (TDH) to grant Southwestern Waste 
Management (SWM)'o a permit to operate an undesirable facility at 
the edge of the City of Houston.71 The plaintiffs contended that 
the decision to locate the facility in their predominantly black 
66 McClesky, 481 U.s. at 286. The Baldus Study researchers studied over 2000 murder 
cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s.Id. at 286. The raw figures showed disparities 
in the imposition of the death penalty, with higher occurrences where victims were white 
and defendants were black. See id. at 286-87. The Baldus Study researchers found similar 
discrepancies in death penalty rulings even after taking into account 230 variables that could 
have explained the disparities on non-racial grounds: black defendants charged with mur-
dering white victims still were more likely to be given the death sentence. Id. 
67 /d. at 297. 
68Id. at 298. 
69 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
70 Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI) was also a defendant. Id. at 676. 
71 /d. at 674-75 (the facility was a solid waste facility). 
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neighborhood and adjacent to a high school with no air-condition-
ing, was partly motivated by racial discrimination in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.72 
The plaintiffs presented two theories of liability.73 The first 
suggested that TDH's permit approval was part of a pattern of 
discrimination in the placement of solid waste sites.74 When the 
court reviewed the data produced by the defendants, however, it 
did not find a pattern of discrimination. Nevertheless, the court did 
recognize that if more detailed data had shown that facilities in 
predominantly white communities were located in minority neigh-
borhoods, such data may have proved discriminatory intent.75 The 
plaintiffs' second theory of liability alleged that TDH's permit ap-
proval process was tainted with discrimination.76 The plaintiffs pre-
sented three sets of data that the court found convincing "at first 
blush," but after further analysis, the court determined that the 
data were not enough to prove discriminatory intent.77 
The court included in the opinion several unanswered ques-
tions for the plaintiffs to pursue if they continued their legal ac-
tions.78 For example, the court indicated that the plaintiffs should 
determine the exact locations of solid waste facilities within each 
7242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (allows civil action for deprivation of rights secured by the 
Constitution and federal laws). 
7S Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677. 
74 [d. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 678. 
77 [d. The first set of data showed that the city's only two solid waste sites were located 
in their community (including the facility in dispute). [d. The court did not find two sites 
"statistically significant" enough to draw a conclusion of discrimination. [d. The second set 
of data focused on the number of solid waste sites located in the target area. [d. The plaintiffs 
argued that while the area contained 15% of Houston's solid waste sites, it contained only 
6.9% of its population, and of this, 70% were minority. [d. The court also declined to infer 
discrimination from these figures. Instead, the court thought that it made sense for the City 
of Houston to locate such facilities in areas with little population, and that half of the target 
area waste sites were in census tracts with more than 70% white population. [d. The third 
set of data focused on the city as a whole and purported to show discriminatory effects 
resulting from the siting process. [d. Although the court admitted that this information was 
the most convincing, it nonetheless discredited the data's conclusiveness using the defendants' 
own figures. [d. at 679. 
78 See id. at 680. Although the landfill was eventually built, the lawsuit did produce some 
positive results. BULLARD, supra note 8, at 54. The Houston City Council passed a resolution 
in 1980 that banned city-owned trucks carrying solid wastes from dumping at the landfill. 
ld. The council also passed an ordinance restricting the siting of solid waste sites near public 
facilities such as schools. [d. In addition, the TDH now requires landfill permit applicants to 
provide detailed land use, economic, and socio-demographic data on sites where they propose 
to locate landfills. [d. 
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census tract to show whether the sites were located primarily next 
to minority neighborhoods within predominantly white tracts.79 The 
court indicated that the plaintiffs should delineate more carefully 
the boundaries of the area affected by the undesirable facility, and 
that they should inquire into the site selection process itself. 80 If the 
plaintiffs discover that the private contractors considered many 
possible sites, the plaintiffs could analyze the various choices to see 
if any patterns of discrimination were apparent.8l Finally, the plain-
tiffs should investigate the factors that influenced TDH's decision 
to grant the permit. 82 While the court considered these questions 
"unanswered," it did not indicate how much additional data favor-
ing the plaintiff's case would be sufficient to infer that the decision 
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. 
In Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block v. Cuomo,83 the court sim-
ilarly held that the plaintiff failed to show discriminatory purpose. 
The City of New York, in attempting to fulfill its "legal and moral" 
responsibilities to supply shelters for the homeless, proposed to 
construct a shelter in Brooklyn.84 The Coalition of Bedford-Stuy-
vesant Block Association (Coalition) submitted an application for a 
preliminary injunction to halt construction of the undesirable facil-
ity, alleging that the siting decision intentionally discriminated 
against black and Hispanic residents in placing an additional shelter 
for the homeless in the Sumner Avenue Armory.85 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the siting process reflected a "pattern and policy of 
racial discrimination."86 Because of this pattern, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the city located all except one city shelter in the Stuy-
vesant area of Brooklyn.87 The plaintiffs claimed that such discrim-
ination violated their rights under laws such as the Fourteenth 
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.88 They sought to enjoin the city 
from building or placing any persons within shelters in North and 
Central Brooklyn, particularly in the Sumner Avenue Armory.89 
79Id. 
80 !d. If discovery reveals that the impact is felt beyond the census tract, they can make 
a larger target area analysis; or, if the impact is limited, they can reduce the target area focus 
accordingly.Id. 
8lId. 
82Id. 
8. 651 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
84 Id. at 1205. 
85Id. at 1206. 
86 Id. 
87Id. 
88Id. 
89Id. At the time this case was litigated, there were 18 community districts in Brooklyn, 
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The court first addressed the discrimination claim, equating 
discrimination with disparate impact.9o The court stated that a dis-
proportionate impact, inferred from statistics, is a form of discrim-
ination when the dis proportionality is "significant."91 With respect 
to the plaintiffs' claims, the court said that to show discrimination 
in the shelter siting process, the plaintiff had to consider the entire 
city in the statistical analysis.92 To that end, the court found the 
plaintiffs' evidence, which was limited to statistical data on Brooklyn, 
inconclusive. The court indicated that the data were inaccurate, 
failed to show disparate impact, and were inappropriate because 
they were not based on city-wide impact.93 The court concluded 
that the figures presented by the plaintiff did not demonstrate a 
"significant disparity" between the number of shelters located' in 
primarily white and predominantly minority districts.94 
The court emphasized that a plaintiff must establish intentional 
or purposeful discrimination in the defendants' site selection deci-
sion even if discriminatory effect were shown.95 In the end, the 
court dismissed the plaintiff's case, which was based solely on sta-
of which eight had a white majority population. Of the six shelters for the homeless located 
in Brooklyn, four were located in community districts with few whites and one was located 
in a white majority district. The second largest shelter in Brooklyn, sheltering over 30% of 
Brooklyn's homeless, was located in a district with an almost 50% white population. In 
addition, two of the city's five family shelters were in Brooklyn. [d. 
The city-wide shelter information for that time showed that 38 of the city's 59 districts 
contained either shelter sites for homeless persons, families, or both. Of the 38 districts, 16 
had a white majority, and half of these 38 had a population which was at least 40% white. 
The largest "singles" shelter in the system was located i.n Manhattan where the population 
was 84.2% white. [d. 
The homeless family figures showed that 16 of the 25 districts sheltering such families 
had a population of at least 40% white, 12 had a population of over 50% white, and 11 had 
a population of over 60% white. Manhattan, a predominantly white area, hosted over 25% 
of all such families housed by the city at that time. The court also indicated that 47.4% of 
the homeless families were housed in the 12 districts with a majority white population. 
Referring to 1980 census figures, minority districts hosted almost 40% of all homeless, 
whereas primarily white districts hosted 44.6% homeless, and mixed districts, 14.6%. [d. at 
1206-07. 
90 [d. at 1209 (citing De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 
U.S. 965 (1979)). 
91 [d. (citations omitted). 
92 [d. 
93/d. 
94Id. at 1210. 
95/d. (citing Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979)). The plaintiff had to show that the defendants selected the Brooklyn site at least in 
part "because of" and not. merely "in spite of" the negative impact on the minority com-
munities alleging discrimination. Id. 
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tistical analysis, because it failed to establish an inference of discrim-
inatory purpose.96 
Coalition demonstrates the impossibility of proving discrimina-
tory purpose using only statistical analysis in complex issues such 
as alleged discriminatory siting practices. But even when a plaintiff 
uses both statistics and supplemental evidence as that suggested in 
Arlington Heights and Bean, showing that a decision was motivated 
by a discriminatory purpose is difficult. For example, the plaintiffs 
in East Bibb Twiggs v. Macon-Bibb County Commission relied on such 
evidence yet were unable to prove discriminatory purpose.97 
In East Bibb Twiggs, the plaintiffs alleged that the decision of 
the Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission (Com-
mission) to site an undesirable facility98 in a predominantly black 
community was motivated in part by racial considerations.99 The 
Commission initially denied a conditional use application for the 
operation of the facility after concluding that the facility would be 
sited next to a residential area; that the area would be subject to 
heavy truck traffic which would increase noise in the area; and that 
the additional traffic and noise would be "undesirable" in a resi-
dential area.lOO After a rehearing, however, the Commission re-
versed its decision and granted the applicants permission to site the 
undesirable facility at the disputed 10cation. lOl 
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that discrim-
inatory purpose was a motivating factor behind the Commission's 
siting decision. 102 Using the Arlington Heights criteria as a basis for 
equal protection analysis, the court dismissed the plaintiff's dispar-
ate impact analysis by noting that the siting of any undesirable 
facility necessarily would have a disproportionate impact on the 
community in which it is located. 103 The court reasoned that because 
blacks comprise the majority of the population in the community 
in question, they would absorb most of the facility's externalities. 
Another decision by the Commission which resulted in the siting of 
a similar facility in a predominantly white community prompted 
96 [d. 
97 See 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
98 The facility is a non-petrucible waste landfill. [d. at 881. Non-petrucible waste includes 
wood, wood by-products, and metal items. [d. at 881 n.1. 
99 [d. at 881. 
100 [d. at 882. 
101 [d. at 883. 
102 [d. at 884. 
10. [d. 
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the court to dismiss any siting pattern explainable on racial 
grounds. 104 Still, the plaintiffs argued that the district was composed 
of approximately 70% black residents, notwithstanding the majority 
white community within the district to which the court referred. 105 
The court found no suggestion of discrimination in the Com-
mission's history of decisions even though the plaintiffs introduced 
numerous newspaper articles that allegedly showed a series of ac-
tions taken by the Commission for discriminatory purposes.106 Nor 
did the court infer discrimination in the Commission's decision-
making process even though the plaintiffs showed that the Com-
mission was aware of racial and socioeconomic discrimination in the 
community.I07 The court also found that the administrative history 
contained no inference of discriminatory purpose even in light of 
the Commission's decision to site the undesirable facility after the 
initial denial. 108 
Like the plaintiffs in East Bibb Twiggs, the plaintiffs in R.I.S.E. 
v. Kayl09 were unable to provide evidence from which discriminatory 
purpose could be inferred. In R.I.S.E. the plaintiffs opposed the 
development of an undesirable facility (landfill) in their community. 
They alleged that they were deprived equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because of the historic placement of land-
fills in predominantly black communities. llo Although the court 
admitted that the siting of such undesirable facilities in King and 
Queen County, Virginia, from 1969 to the time of trial has had a 
disproportionate impact on black residents, the court held that the 
plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence proving the requisite 
discriminatory purpose. I I I 
The court found that the plaintiffs did not provide any evi-
dence that met the criteria established in Arlington Heights. ll2 The 
administrative steps taken by the King and Queen County Board 
104 [d. 
10. [d. at 884-85. 
106 [d. at 885. 
107 [d. at 885-86. The plaintiffs cited to a study on housing issued in March of 1974 in 
which the Commission found that racial and socioeconomic discrimination existed in the 
community. [d. 
108 [d. at 886-87. 
109 768 F. Supp. 1144 (1991). aff'd. No. 91-2144. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 26732 (4th Cir. 
Oct. 15. 1992). R.I.S.E.. Inc .• (Residents Involved in Saving the Environment) is a hi-racial 
community organization. /d. at 1145. 
110 [d. at 1149. 
III [d. 
112 [d. 
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of Supervisors (Board) to negotiate the purchase of the site and the 
authorization of its use as a landfill revealed "nothing unusual or 
suspicious."1l3 The court noted that the Board "appear[ed] to have 
balanced the economic, environmental, and cultural needs of the 
County in a responsible and conscientious manner."1l4 According 
to the court, the Board responded to the concerns and suggestions 
of citizens opposed to the landfill even after the first proposed site 
was rejected because of fiscal constraints. II5 The Board established 
a citizens' advisory group, evaluated alternative site recommenda-
tions made by the Concerned Citizens' Steering Committee, and 
discussed with the landfill operator ways to mitigate the negative 
impact of the facility.II6 In short, the court refused to infer discrim-
inatory purpose, thus deferring to the Board, and effectively sanc-
tioned a process that ultimately leads to the disproportionate place-
ment of undesirable facilities in black communities. 
The outcomes in Bean, Coalition, East Bibb Twiggs, and R.I.S.E., 
indicate a process that consistently results in the siting of an unde-
sirable facility in a minority community will pass constitutional mus-
ter so long as the evidence does not allow an inference of discrim-
inatory purpose. Plausible reasons for siting discrepancies other 
than discrimination can obscure discriminatory purpose. Though 
case law identifies inquiries which may prove discriminatory pur-
pose, it does not indicate the degree of proof necessary to infer 
discriminatory purpose. Even if the degree of proof needed is 
quantifiable, it is unclear if plaintiffs would be able to meet the 
burden. 
B. Discriminatory Siting Practices and Unconscious Racism 
1. The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention 
Commentators have argued tha~ judicial intervention is war-
ranted where, for example, a dispute is "so deeply divisive as to 
113 [d. at 1149-50. 
114 [d. at 1150. 
115 [d. 
1I6/d. United States District Judge Richard L. Williams said that "[a]t worst, the [Board] 
appear[s] to have been more concerned about the economic and legal plight of the County 
as a whole than the sentiments of residents who oppose the placement of the landfill in their 
neighborhood." [d. 
The court commented that "the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an affirmative 
duty to equalize the impact of official actions on different racial groups. Rather, it merely 
prohibits government officials from intentionally discriminating on the basis of race." [d. 
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moot the applicability of basic democratic principles."ll7 These basic 
democratic principles encompass the proposition that laws enacted 
by majority vote dictate how disputes are legally resolved. Histori-
cally, segregation laws, for example, were enacted by majority vote 
and were summarily dismantled by an arguably activist Supreme 
Court. ll8 Since that time, however, such blatantly racist laws are no 
longer in effect, yet the effects of others-such as siting statutes-
demonstrate that they too can have an impact along racial lines. 
Given that underrepresented persons are finding themselves 
subject to disproportionate levels of environmental risks, and that 
siting processes legally place undesirable facilities in minority com-
munities in higher numbers than in white communities, 119 the courts 
should be a proper forum in which victims can seek relief. There 
are other ways traditionally disempowered groups have, to a degree, 
successfully brought about changes in the law, such as through grass 
roots activism. 120 The courts should intervene, however, where the 
impact of disproportionate placement of facilities may have a det-
rimental effect on entire racial categories that historically have been 
subject to unequal treatment in various contexts. 121 The interven-
tion need not dictate wholesale judicial intrusion into the legislative 
and political processes. On the contrary, such intervention, in the 
context of allegedly discriminatory siting, may only counsel the 
application of heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis. 
117 Robert A. Burt, Cowtitutiollal Law and !he Tmchillg of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 
484 (1984). See also Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: 
Democrac.y, DistrttSt. and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89 (1984). 
"" See Burt, supra note 117, at 483. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from restricting children on racial grounds 
from attending state schools); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (plan of desegregation 
reinstated). 
11'1 See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text. 
120 See Cole, supra note 8, at 1997. Luke W. Cole, Staff Attorney for the California Rural 
Legal Assistance Foundation, notes that although the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 
1960s brought about changes in the law by a{~tivists "taking to the streets across the country," 
"conservative courts" have weakened civil rights laws. fd. 
121 The UCC Report concludes that the disproportionate negative effect of toxic waste 
on minorities is part of a pattern consistent with the findings of other studies. See UCC 
Report, supra note 8, at 15. For example, the Children's Defense Fund found that black 
infant mortality rates were twice as high as those for white children during the first year of 
life. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND BUDGET: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
FY 1987 FEDERAL BUDGET AND CHILDREN 319 (1986). In the U.S. Department of Health's 
report on black and minority health, the report showed that there was a wide health gap 
between minority and non-minority persons in the United States. See 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH 1-5 (1985). 
1993] INEQUITABLE SITING PRACTICES 253 
2. Unconscious Racism and "Cultural Meaning"122 
Although there are several legal strategies available for plain-
tiffs to pursue,123 claims based on federal equal protection are un-
likely to succeed because they attempt to rectify "unconscious ra-
cism."124 The modern equal protection doctrine is, for the most 
part, ineffective against forms of discrimination where discrimina-
tory motivation is subtle because requiring proof of intent or pur-
pose does not take into account "both the irrationality of racism 
and the profound effect that the history of American race relations 
has had on the individual and collective unconscious."125 In light of 
cases such as Coalition and East Bibb Twiggs, and in the face of studies 
such as the UCC Report, unconscious racism may explain the dis-
proportionate siting of such facilities in minority communities. 126 If 
unconscious racism is responsible for the disproportionate place-
ment of undesirable facilities in minority communities, then present 
federal equal protection is an inadequate legal remedy. 
There is an alternative to the current equal protection analysis, 
however, that addresses unconscious racism by taking into account 
122 Charles R. Lawrence, III, The [d, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 351-56 (1987). 
123 For example, Godsil outlines a proposed law based on Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 
to 2000e-17 (1988), and an amendment to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988), as a way to address discriminatory siting through 
legislation. See supra note 8, at 421-25. Tsao suggests that state law theories may provide 
greater protection of individual rights. Supra note 8, at 394-405. 
124 Lawrence, supra note 122, at 321-23. The burden of proving discriminatory purpose 
set forth in Davis is extremely difficult to meet. As Laurence Tribe, professor of law at 
Harvard Law School, has indicated: 
... Washington v. Davis announced that henceforth every lawsuit involving consti-
tutional claims of racial discrimination directed at facially race-neutral rules would 
be conducted as a search for a bigoted decision-maker. This [perspective] sees 
contemporary racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon-the historical leg-
acy of centuries of slavery and subjugation-but as the misguided retrograde ... 
behavior of individual actors in an enlightened, egalitarian society. If such actors 
cannot be found-and the standards for finding them are tough indeed-then there 
has been no violation of the equal protection clause. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-20, at 1509 (2d ed. 1988). 
In the context of proving discriminatory purpose in a complex process, such as the siting 
of an undesirable facility, a plaintiff would face the nearly impossible task of finding the 
"bigoted decision-maker." As Tribe notes, this standard does not address discrimination as a 
social phenomenon. See also Lawrence, supra note 122, at 324-25 (,,[b]y insisting that a 
blameworthy perpetrator be found before the existence of racial discrimination can be 
acknowledged, the Court creates an imaginary world where discrimination does not exist 
unless it was consciously intended"). 
125 Lawrence, supra note 122, at 323. 
126 See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text. 
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the "cultural meaning" of an allegedly racially discriminatory act.!27 
Applying this theory, 
[t]he court would analyze governmental behavior much like a 
cultural anthropologist might: by considering evidence regard-
ing the historical and social context in which the decision was 
made and effectuated. If the court determined by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that a significant portion of the popu-
lation thinks of the governmental action in racial terms, then it 
would presume that socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes 
made evident by the action's meaning had influenced the deci-
sionmakers. As a result, it would apply heightened scrutiny.128 
Thus, instead of looking at the reasonableness of the governmental 
behavior, a court would determine whether the state action serves 
an "important" objective and is "substantially related" to attaining 
the objective.!29 V nder heightened scrutiny, the state actor is held 
to a standard of review higher than under mere rationality analysis. 
This added edge in the legal analysis would give state actors less 
judicial deference and impose on the plaintiff a lower burden of 
proof. 
3. Application of Cultural Meaning to Discriminatory Siting Cases 
Application of this test to Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management 
Corporation illustrates this theory.!30 V nder the cultural meaning 
analysis, several kinds of evidence demonstrate that the decision to 
site the undesirable facility had a cultural meaning that denigrated 
blacks. In addition to the evidence they originally provided, the 
plaintiffs in Bean could present the findings of national studies such 
as the VCC Report, the GAO Report and the National Law Journal 
Study as evidence of historical placement of undesirable facilities in 
minority communities and the related negative impacts. They could 
also include accounts of housing segregation mandated by statutes 
and restrictive covenants as analogous to the concentration of un-
desirable land uses in minority communities.!3! As further evidence 
of the cultural meaning Houston residents applied to the TDH's 
decision to locate the facility in the minority community, the plain-
127 Lawrence, supra note 122, at 355. 
128 I d. at 356. 
129 See supra note 38 for discussion of heightened scrutiny analysis. 
130 482 F. Supp. 673 (1979). For another application of Lawrence's cultural meaning 
analysis to the facts of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977), see Lawrence, supra note 122, at &36-69. 
131 See Lawrence, supra note 122, at 366 n.231-32 and accompanying text. 
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tiffs could show whether any public meetings were held, and the 
reactions of those in attendance. 132 The comments by residents and 
public officials at the meetings could reveal a "social issue" 
agenda. 133 Although such evidence, in and of itself, may not lead 
to the conclusion that racial animus led to the placement of the 
undesirable facility in a minority community, it would be probative 
of the cultural meaning of TDH's decision to site the facility in a 
black community.134 
Finally, the court could look to the irrationality of the decision 
by the TDH to site the facility where it did as evidence of the action's 
racial meaning. 135 In dicta following the Bean court's analysis of the 
statistical and non-statistical evidence, for example, the court 
strongly criticized the TDH's decision to issue the facility a permit. 
The court indicated that if it were the TDH, it would have denied 
the permit because "[i]t simply does not make sense to put the 
[facility] so close to a high school ... [nor] does it make sense to 
put a solid waste site so close to a residential neighborhood."136 This 
criticism levied by the court indicates that there were racial impli-
cations to TDH's action and provides additional evidence of cultural 
meaning. Taken together, these factors could convince a court, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that many thought of TDH's 
action in racial terms. Thereafter, the presumption would be that 
this unconscious racial attitude is shared by society as a whole and 
had influenced TDH's action. Thus, heightened scrutiny would be 
applicable and the defendant state actor would bear a greater bur-
den in defending its actions. 
In Arlington Heights, Justice Powell suggested several sources of 
circumstantial proof that could show discriminatory purpose. 137 The 
proposed analysis would take the Arlington Heights inquiry one step 
further to include circumstantial evidence of additional trends of 
discrimination. This next step is necessary, for example, because 
132 The local residents in Bean formed the Northeast Community Action Group as a way 
of organizing their efforts to stop the facility's construction. BULLARD, supra note 8, at 53. 
133 See Lawrence, supra note 122, at 367 (discussing how supporters and opponents 
referred to the "social issue" of rezoning in Arlington Heights). See also Arlington Heights, 429 
U.S. at 257-58. 
134 See Lawrence, supra note 122, at 368. 
135 See id. (discussing the "unreasonableness of the nonracial criteria upon which the 
[Arlington Heights] board relied"). 
136 Bean v. Southwestern Management Corp. 482 F. Supp. 673, 679-80 (S.D. Tex. 1979), 
aff'd without opinion, 782 F.2d lO38 (5th Cir. 1986). The court also said that "[l]and use 
considerations alone would seem to militate against granting this permit." [d. at 679. 
137 See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. 
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cases such as Bean show the difficulty of providing "statistically 
significant" evidence of disparate impact where there are relatively 
few facilities. 138 Coalition similarly demonstrates the inadequacy of 
relying on the number of facilities within small geographic areas 
for evidence of disparate impact. 139 That the size of a sample is too 
small to support an inference of disparate impact does not neces-
sarily mean that local siting practices are not tainted with illegal 
discriminatory purpose. Ultimately, this proposed analysis would 
complement present equal protection doctrine, as enunciated by 
Justice Powell in Arlington Heights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note examined the disproportionate siting of undesirable 
facilities in minority communities. Although there are studies doc-
umenting the disproportionate siting of toxic waste dumps, the 
same disparity may exist with respect to other similarly unwanted 
land uses as prisons, homeless shelters, and low-income housing. 
What is clear, however, is that the modern equal protection doctrine 
is ill-suited to address discriminatory siting practices because of the 
unwieldy discriminatory purpose requirement. The realities of com-
plex siting processes can obscure most any discriminatory motive, 
just as any legal reason can explain most siting decisions. Equal 
protection perhaps can provide relief if the current doctrinal anal-
ysis includes serious consideration of other factors, such as history 
and social context. By using these factors as part of the analysis, 
courts can justify applying a heightened scrutiny where, as in the 
disproportionate siting of undesirable facilities, history has shown 
that particular racial groups have been subject to unfair treatment. 
This change in equal protection analysis would not represent a 
dramatic shift away from current doctrine, as enunciated in Arling-
ton Heights, but it would demonstrate a court's willingness to ac-
knowledge a discrete and observable phenomenon. 
Rodolfo Mata 
138 See Bean. 482 F. Supp. at 678. 
139 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. 
